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Research summary: Past inquiry has found that implementing complex 
competitive repertoires (i.e., diverse and dynamic arrays of actions) is chal-
lenging, but firms benefit from doing so. Our examination of the antecedents 
and outcomes of complex competitive repertoires develops a more nuanced 
perspective. Data from 1,168 firms in 204 industries reveal that complex-
ity initially harms performance, but then becomes a positive factor, except 
at high levels. We use agency and tournament theories, respectively, to ex-
amine how key governance mechanisms—ownership structure and execu-
tive compensation—help shape firms’ competitive repertoires. We find that 
the principals of agency theory and the pay gap of tournament theory are 
both important antecedents of competitive complexity, and an interaction 
exists wherein firms build especially complex repertoires when both influ-
ences are strong. 
Managerial summary: In boxing, the fight does not always go to the big-
ger or stronger person, or even to whomever throws the most punches—the 
fight is sometimes won by the boxer who is unpredictable, such as throwing 
an uppercut when the opponent expected a right hook. Similarly, when com-
panies compete in the marketplace, advantage is afforded not only to those 
with more resources or who engage in more competitive activity, but also 
to those whose actions are unpredictable. In this study, we develop the no-
tion of “competitive complexity,” which describes the diversity and changing 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
Connelly et al .  in  Strategic  Management Journal  38 (2017)       2
nature of a company’s competitive moves. Implementing complex compet-
itive repertoires can be painful in the short term but, if done correctly, can 
help company performance in the long run.  
Keywords: competitive dynamics; institutional investors; executive com-
pensation; agency theory; tournament theory 
Introduction 
In their quest to improve performance, firms battle one another via 
competitive moves (Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm, 1999; Miller and Chen, 
1994). While individual high-stakes actions, such as AT&T’s recent $48 
billion purchase of DirecTV, tend to grab headlines, many firms seek 
to gain advantage by relying on a diverse and dynamic mix of compet-
itive moves, such as price reductions, marketing campaigns, acquisi-
tions, alliances, and new products and services. For instance, in 2010 
alone, healthcare company Baxter International initiated five differ-
ent types of competitive actions. Others try to succeed by picking one 
or two of these moves and using them aggressively and persistently 
(Ferrier, 2001). Baxter’s competitor Endo Health, for example, initi-
ated more than twice as many competitive moves as Baxter in 2010, 
but concentrated its competitive activity within just two types. As 
competition continues over time, engaging rivals with a complex set 
of actions allows a firm to respond better to changing environmental 
conditions, take advantage of emerging opportunities, defy imitation 
by rivals, and keep opponents off guard. Strategy researchers call this 
competitive repertoire complexity,1 and studies have found it to be pos-
itively associated with firm performance (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and 
Lyon, 2004; Ferrier et al., 1999; Ndofor, Sirmon, and He, 2011; Yu, 
Subramaniam, and Cannella, 2009).   
Our study challenges the received wisdom about the benefits of 
competitive repertoire complexity. While scholars generally portray 
complexity as beneficial, we offer a more nuanced perspective wherein 
understanding the effects of complexity requires accounting for the 
role of time. Indeed, firms may struggle to orchestrate and benefit 
from a diverse set of competitive action types in short order (Miller 
and Chen, 1994). Therefore, we develop and test a model wherein 
1. For ease of exposition, we use the terms “complexity,” “competitive complexity,” 
and “competitive repertoire complexity” interchangeably throughout this article. 
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competitive repertoire complexity has differential effects on firm per-
formance in the short-term compared to its effects over time, control-
ling for firms’ competitive aggressiveness (i.e., their level of compet-
itive activity). 
In order to build understanding of why some firms embrace the 
inherent trade-offs of competitive complexity while others avoid 
them, we also investigate factors that may influence whether firms 
rely on complex repertoires of competitive actions. Studies of the an-
tecedents to complexity have mainly focused on competitive/indus-
try environments and managerial/organizational characteristics (cf. 
Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Ndofor et al., 2011; Yu et al., 
2009). However, in their recommendations for future competitive 
dynamics research, Chen and Miller (2012: 173) note that “increas-
ingly insightful results may be forthcoming were we to move more to 
micro-conceptions that lie between ownership structure and perfor-
mance— specifically, just who are the owners and what types of com-
petitive initiatives are they most apt to sponsor?” We leverage this 
guidance by examining how governance mechanisms, such as own-
ership  structures and executive compensation, shape a firm’s com-
petitive repertoire. 
Our study offers two main potential contributions to the litera-
ture. First, we develop a textured, temporal perspective on the rela-
tionship between competitive complexity and firm performance that 
sheds light on how complexity influences firm outcomes, revealing 
both positive and negative consequences. Second, we make strides to-
ward integrating governance research with work on competitive dy-
namics (Chen, 1996). Although governance is believed to affect firms’ 
competitive moves, surprisingly few studies develop or test theory 
about how shareholders and compensation structures affect compet-
itive activity (Chen and Miller, 2012). Doing so can uncover a set of 
previously obscured relationships and expose hidden forces that influ-
ence the extent to which firms engage in diverse competitive actions. 
Conceptual Development 
The concept of competitive complexity has its roots in competitive dy-
namics research. This body of inquiry has long focused on describing, 
explaining, and predicting both the competitive interactions among 
firms as well as how these interactions shape firm performance (Chen 
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and MacMillan, 1992; Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 2005). For example, 
much of the early competitive dynamics research focused on action-re-
sponse dyads wherein the characteristics of a given firm’s initial com-
petitive action influence the likelihood and speed of a rival’s response 
and in turn these action-response sequences influence firms’ fates in 
the marketplace (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Smith et al., 1991). 
Scholars later focused attention on competitive action repertoire, a 
concept that centers on the portfolio of moves a firm makes in a given 
time period (Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996a, 1996b). This depiction of 
competitive action is consistent with views of strategy as a stream 
of decisions (Mintzberg, 1978), a coordinated series of actions (Mac-
Crimmon, 1993), or a simultaneous, sequential thrust of competitive 
maneuvers (D’Aveni, 1994). Researchers have examined which orga-
nizational, market, and perceptual antecedents shape a firm’s compet-
itive repertoire (Ferrier, 2001; Gnyawali, He, and Madhavan, 2006; 
Yu et al., 2009) as well as how attributes of a firm’s repertoire affect 
performance (Deephouse, 1999; Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Ndofor et al., 
2011). By leveraging the repertoire concept, these studies provide a 
holistic depiction of how characteristics of a firm’s body of competi-
tive activity allow it to compete effectively or cause it to struggle in 
the marketplace. 
The origins of portraying competitive complexity as an important 
dimension of repertoires can be traced to Miller’s (1993) discussion 
of its antonym: competitive simplicity.2 Scholars have conceptualized 
competitive complexity in subtly different ways, but these depictions 
share the common trait that complexity involves a firm’s diversity of 
competitive actions (i.e., a firm’s range of actions and they are dom-
inated by specific types—Basdeo et al., 2006; Chi, Ravichandran, and 
Andrevski, 2010; Ferrier, 2001; Gnyawali et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2009). 
2. Miller (1993: 117) introduced the notion of competitive simplicity, defining it as 
“an overwhelming preoccupation with a single goal, strategic activity, department, 
or world view—one that increasingly precludes consideration of any others.” This 
spawned studies that focused on simplicity, or the tendency for the firm to carry 
out a narrow set of actions, as a key attribute of a firm’s competitive action reper-
toire (Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller and Chen, 1996a). Over 
time, most competitive dynamics scholars embraced the concept of competitive 
repertoire complexity to represent the opposite pole of a simplicity/complexity 
continuum (Basdeo et al., 2006; Chi et al., 2010; Ferrier and Lee, 2002;Yu et al., 
2009). For example, Ndofor et al. (2011: 644) note that “competitive complexity 
is the inverse of competitive simplicity” and Ferrier (2001: 866) refers to the con-
struct as “competitive complexity/simplicity.”   
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Empirical investigations have yielded valuable insights about compet-
itive complexity’s antecedents and outcomes. In terms of antecedents, 
prior performance (Miller and Chen, 1996a), top management team 
(TMT) heterogeneity and experience (Ferrier, 2001; Miller and Chen, 
1996a), interorganizational networks (Chi et al., 2010; Gnyawali et 
al., 2006), and multimarket contact (Yu et al., 2009) all influence the 
complexity of firms’ competitive repertoires. In terms of outcomes, 
studies have found a robust relationship between competitive reper-
toire complexity and firm performance across a variety of industries 
(Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller and 
Chen, 1996a).  
The prevailing conceptualization of complexity has served the lit-
erature well, but it also presents an opportunity for improvement be-
cause it is limited to considering competitive repertoires at a snapshot 
in time (Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor, 2001). Such an approach ignores 
the inter-temporal change and newness of a firm’s repertoire of ac-
tions. For example, suppose a firm engages in a broad range of actions 
distributed evenly among different types,  but it relies on that same set 
of actions repeatedly. A traditional definition would label this as com-
plex, but consideration of repertoire change over time reveals a repet-
itive pattern that rivals could easily diagnose and counteract. Thus, we 
suggest that a more comprehensive conceptualization of competitive 
complexity should account for inter-temporal change and newness.3  
At various junctures, competitive dynamics researchers have 
broadly discussed the principles underlying inter-temporal change and 
newness in competitive activity. For example, Miller and Chen (1994) 
proposed the concept of “competitive inertia,” which describes the ex-
tent to which a firm alters its competitive stance over time. Lamberg 
et al. (2009) explore aspects of “strategic consistency,” by which they 
mean the stability of competitive behavior over time. A related con-
cept is the degree of “surprise” or “unpredictability” (Ferrier, 2001; 
Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Rindova, Ferrier, and Wiltbank, 2010), which 
refer to a competitor’s relative inability to determine what is coming 
next. These ideas collectively point to the concept of inter-temporal 
change and newness of a firm’s competitive activity as important char-
acteristics of competitive repertoire complexity. Consistent with these 
ideas, we view complexity as encompassing the diversity, change, and 
newness of a firms’ competitive action repertoire. 
3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this important observation.  
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Hypotheses 
Performance outcomes 
In his seminal article on competitive simplicity, Miller (1993) intro-
duced the notion that a firm’s decisions about the simplicity/complex-
ity of its competitive activities could have differential short- and long-
term consequences. He posited that simplicity (complexity) would at 
first increase (decrease) performance, but over long periods of time 
should lead to lower (higher) performance. More specifically, firms 
that rely on a narrow repertoire of competitive actions may enjoy im-
mediate success, but in doing so they could be tethering themselves 
to a confined set of skills that will not allow them to grow and change 
with a changing competitive landscape. 
To explain this in more detail, first consider how low levels of 
competitive complexity (i.e., high simplicity) can benefit a firm in the 
short term. Firms must develop a distinctive competence, and doing 
so often demands that they be committed to doing a few things ex-
tremely well (Selznick, 1949). Parsimony in the types of competitive 
actions in which a firm repeatedly engages allows for simple, efficient 
routines and orchestrated configurations that can create competitive 
advantage (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990). Managers can exploit what 
they do best and minimize the chance of error that comes with change. 
Relatedly, carrying out simple competitive action repertoires can be 
reassuring to external stakeholders. Competitive complexity makes 
buying decisions more difficult, which can alienate customers. In ad-
dition, the stock market discounts uncertainty about firm activity be-
cause investors are unable to evaluate fully the earnings potential of 
their actions (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Thus, low levels of competi-
tive complexity can save costs, avoid disturbing customers (and pro-
voking rivals), appease shareholders, and allow managers to capitalize 
on their strengths (Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993). Accordingly, 
our initial prediction is: 
Hypothesis 1a: The complexity of a firm’s competitive action 
repertoire over a given year (year t) is negatively associated 
with short-term performance (at the end of year t). 
In considering longer performance horizons, organizational learn-
ing helps explain why a certain amount of competitive complexity is 
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likely to be beneficial to a firm’s performance trend (i.e., the direction 
performance is headed over the course of several years).When firms 
successfully and repeatedly leverage a narrow set of actions, execu-
tives can wrongly gain confidence in simplistic recipes, providing them 
with a rationale for ascribing merit to their favorite actions and de-
creasing comparative regard for other competitive moves (Levitt and 
March, 1988; Miller, 1993). This “superstitious learning” inhibits firm 
performance over time because managers become myopic with respect 
to their choices of competitive action types (Zollo, 2009). In contrast, 
complex competitive repertoires outfit managers with more tools in 
their metaphorical tool belt. Because complexity engenders changing 
repertoires, valuable learning occurs as managers tease out which ac-
tions brought about which outcomes under differing circumstances 
(Miller, Droge, and Vickery, 1997). As new challenges arise, having a 
range of skills, resources, and experiences from which to draw allows 
the firm to address these challenges by carrying out the most appro-
priate combination of competitive actions (Easterby-Smith, Crossan, 
and Nicolini, 2000). 
Moreover, complex competitive repertoires also serve as a sig-
nal to external entities about the firm’s underlying quality and their 
changing mix of resources, allowing them to build a reputation over 
time (Basdeo et al., 2006).Miller and Chen (1996a) argue that com-
petitive repertoire complexity operates as a positive signal to stake-
holders about the management skills of top executives, and Ferrier et 
al. (1999) suggest that it signals a broader range of underlying firm 
capabilities. This signaling process takes time as stakeholders receive, 
process, and interpret signals, act accordingly (e.g., shareholders buy-
ing stock, information intermediaries upgrading their analyses, poten-
tial partners establishing alliances), and provide feedback about the 
signals (Bergh et al., 2015). Taken together, these arguments about 
improved adaptation, learning, and signaling suggest that increased 
levels of competitive complexity can result in improved firm perfor-
mance over time (i.e., an upward performance trend). 
One important caveat is that organizations can go too far, such that 
as competitive complexity reaches high levels its disadvantages can 
begin to outweigh its advantages.4 Theory on resource orchestration 
4. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this key recommendation about the non-
linear relationship.  
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helps explain why. Building on Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland’s (2007) con-
tention that how firms select, bundle, and leverage their resources 
via their strategic actions is a key determinant of performance, Ndo-
for et al. (2011) found that superior performance arises when a firm’s 
actions appropriately capitalize on its resources. Subsequently, the 
same author team provided evidence that the TMT is an important 
determinant of how well a firm is able to attain “the conversion of 
resources to competitive actions (i.e., type of actions designed to le-
verage the firm’s resource base) and the conversion of those actions 
to performance (i.e., executing those actions)” (Ndofor, Sirmon, and 
He, 2015: 1657).   
In considering competitive repertoires, we contend that if a firm’s 
array of actions become excessively complex (i.e., too diverse, chang-
ing, and new), the firm’s ability to orchestrate the associated manage-
rial resources could become overwhelmed such that its effectiveness 
declines. This parallels arguments offered in Penrose’s (1959) semi-
nal book. Penrose suggested that firms often cannot grow as much as 
market opportunities allow because they do not have enough manag-
ers to effectively implement the growth. New managers can be hired, 
but it takes time for these newcomers to be effective in their jobs. Like 
an army that penetrates deeper into enemy territory than its person-
nel and supply lines can support, a firm that ignores its managerial 
constraints and grows beyond them is likely to suffer decreased per-
formance. Drawing on the logic offered by Penrose (1959); Sirmon et 
al. (2007), and Ndofor et al. (2011, 2015), we contend that a firm will 
experience a downward performance trend if it enacts a bigger vari-
ety of competitive moves than the managerial resources provided by 
its executives can support. 
Further, with respect to learning, an overly diverse and constantly 
changing competitive action repertoire makes it difficult for managers 
to connect actions or sets of actions with particular outcomes (Levitt 
and March, 1988). Signaling, too, could be adversely affected by high 
levels of competitive repertoire complexity. If a firm changes its rep-
ertoire too quickly, external stakeholders may question whether the 
firm has a coherent pattern of actions, and thus, wonder if it lacks 
a cohesive strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). In sum, too much competi-
tive complexity can bring about unintended consequences that bring 
about a downward performance trend. Therefore, we hypothesize the 
following: 
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Hypothesis 1b: The complexity of a firm’s competitive action 
repertoire over a given year (year t) exhibits a curvilinear (in-
verted U-shape) relationship with a firm’s performance trend 
over time (the direction of performance over several years 
beginning at the end of year t). That is, increasing levels of 
competitive complexity are associated with increases in the 
firm’s performance trend, up to a certain level of competi-
tive complexity, after which further increases in competitive 
complexity are associated with decreases in the firm’s perfor-
mance trend. 
Given our prior hypotheses, firms likely desire to implement com-
petitive action repertoires near the optimum inflection point between 
simplicity and complexity. However, managers make decisions within 
the context of corporate constraints that can inhibit their range of 
choices (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Scholars seeking to explain the 
antecedents of managerial decisions about the competitive actions in 
which they engage have looked external to the firm, at the competitive 
environment, and internal to the firm, at organizational characteris-
tics, but few have looked upward, at the firms’ governance structures. 
In strategic management, the most commonly investigated corpo-
rate governance structures are boards of directors, ownership struc-
tures, and mechanisms of executive compensation (Aguilera et al., 
2015).5 The dominant means of explaining the first two is agency the-
ory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the dominant means of explain-
ing the last one is tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). To 
obtain a multifaceted picture of corporate governance influences, we 
examine antecedents from both theoretical perspectives.  
Agency theory antecedents 
Agency theory acknowledges that executives’ actions at times deviate 
from the interests of shareholders. In response, shareholders rely on 
5. Agency theory does not provide a clear rationale for the direction of relationships 
between various aspects of the board and managerial decisions about competi-
tive complexity (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001). Rather than developing hypoth-
eses about board influence, we control for it and devote special attention to in-
terpreting the controls and creating a road map for future research on the topic.  
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governance mechanisms to create better alignment between their in-
terests and executives’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We hy-
pothesize about how two of the most commonly studied mechanisms 
of corporate governance—ownership concentration and executive com-
pensation—affect executives’ propensity to undertake complex com-
petitive repertoires. 
Although most small owners do not have the means to influence a 
firm’s actions, powerful principals can motivate executives to engage 
in specific types of competitive behavior (David, Hitt, and Gimeno, 
2001). Research examining shareholder influence on managerial deci-
sion-making focuses largely on institutional investors with their con-
centrated shares. An institutional investor is an organization, such 
as a mutual fund, pension fund, or endowment, that manages more 
than $100 million in equity (David, Bloom, and Hillman, 2007). Such 
investors are required to file 13-F Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) reports listing all holdings greater than 10,000 shares or 
$200,000 in market value. These prominent shareholders own over 
70 percent of U.S. equities and maintain an outsized influence on firm 
behavior (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Kochhar and David, 1996). 
Research has seen two types of institutional investors come to 
the fore. Dedicated investors maintain concentrated shareholdings 
in a small number of firms for a long time and do not trade based on 
short-term earnings (Bushee, 2001). Dedicated institutional inves-
tors are sometimes called “relational investors” because they engage 
with their agents and are active in establishing competitive strategies 
(Bhagat, Black, and Blair, 2004). Transient institutional investors are 
the opposite. They hold shares in a diverse range of firms, frequently 
trade in and out of stocks, and are keenly aware of earnings reports. 
We develop theory about how these characteristics make dedicated 
and transient investors particularly consequential to managerial de-
cisions about competitive complexity. 
A significant presence of dedicated investors may allow execu-
tives an extra measure of freedom to experiment with a diverse set 
of competitive actions. One reason has to do with these investors not 
trading based on current earnings reports (Bushee, 2001). As we ar-
gued above, complex competitive repertoires can adversely affect a 
firm’s short-term performance. Managers may be unlikely to under-
take a complex repertoire if they believe doing so will result in owner 
exit. Dedicated investors do not sell their holdings when faced with 
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short-term losses, so they provide a level of assurance to managers, 
who may undertake new and diverse competitive moves without fear 
of stock market repercussions. Stated differently, dedicated investors 
help reduce managerial myopia because managers do not feel exter-
nal pressure from shareholders for immediate returns at the poten-
tial expense of long-term gains (Edmans, 2009). 
Another reason arises because, in contrast to transient investors 
who hold a diversified portfolio of equities to mitigate risk, dedicated 
investors hold a small number of firms over time. Dedicated investors, 
therefore, may consider action repertoire complexity as a key mech-
anism to mitigate risk. Relatedly, because dedicated investors own 
only a few firms, they can comprehend and be sympathetic of the ra-
tionales that underlie a diversity of competitive actions. Given their 
concentrated holdings, dedicated investors can devote sufficient at-
tention to understanding managerial intentions for competitive mar-
ket gains, and thus, engage in strategic evaluation of competitive rep-
ertoires rather than relying solely on short-term financial measures. 
Complex competitive repertoires can take time to understand, and the 
institutional investor that holds its shares only briefly may not read-
ily grasp the potential of such repertoires. By understanding and ap-
preciating the strategic consequences of complex competitive reper-
toires, dedicated investors enable their agents to consider engaging 
in diverse competitive moves that yield advantages over time. There-
fore, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Level of dedicated institutional ownership is 
positively associated with competitive complexity. 
Transient institutional investors are short-term investors who hold 
broad portfolios of shares in many firms. This is a fundamentally dif-
ferent set of principals that are not necessarily interested in under-
standing the long-term performance implications of firm actions (Koh, 
2007). The short-term focus of their trading behavior does not mo-
tivate managers to execute complex competitive repertoires. In fact, 
they could contribute to managerial myopia as these investors impose 
external pressure to focus on near-term objectives (Bushee, 1998). 
Indeed, to keep transient investors on board, executives may need to 
compete with relatively simple competitive repertoires with a view 
toward short-term gains. Compared to dedicated investors who are 
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likely to devote more effort to understanding complex business mod-
els and competitive repertoires, transient investors may be keyed in 
to rudimentary signals of a firm’s business model facilitated by a set 
of familiar competitive actions, again forcing managers to be myopic 
(Rindova et al., 2010). Transient investors are averse to the short-term 
performance declines associated with competitive complexity because 
these investors tend to trade out from firms that experience even tem-
porary downturns (Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy, 2003), so they are 
likely to discourage managers from making decisions that engender 
complex repertoires. Thus, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Level of transient institutional ownership is 
negatively associated with competitive complexity. 
 
Tournament theory antecedent 
Top executives design and implement competitive actions, and they 
may use those actions with a view toward gaining promotion and 
power. Therefore, firms often use compensation as a governance 
mechanism to incentivize the right kind of executive behavior. Tour-
nament theory suggests that the pay gap between the CEO and TMT is 
a particularly potent motivator of executive action (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981). Like agency theory, tournament theory is an economic theory 
that explains how firms can use governance (i.e., compensation struc-
tures) to elicit desired behavior from agents (Ehrenberg and Bog-
nanno, 1990). Tournament theorists propose that executives compete 
against one another for high-level positions, with the main predic-
tion being that employee effort increases mainly with differences in 
pay between levels, rather than the absolute levels of pay (Devaro, 
2006). The strongest incentives lay at the highest level of the organi-
zation, wherein exorbitantly high CEO pay inspires the TMT to take 
actions that maximize their chances of attaining the CEO spot for 
themselves (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001). As a result, tourna-
ment theory would suggest that a wide CEO-TMT pay gap should in-
crease the volume of a firm’s competitive activity (Gnyawali, Offstein, 
and Lau, 2008). 
In addition, we argue that the CEO-TMT pay gap (hereinafter sim-
ply “pay gap”) is also likely to be consequential to a firm’s competitive 
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complexity because wide pay gaps compel top managers to make 
choices that increase their potential for promotion (Narayanan, 1985). 
The skills-based model of leadership (Mumford et al., 2000b; Yamma-
rino, 2000) helps explain why. The model consists of six elements: (1) 
individual attributes (such as motivation and personality), (2) knowl-
edge and skills, (3) career experiences, (4) environmental influences, 
(5) problem solving, and (6) leader performance (Mumford et al., 
2000b: 23). According to Mumford et al. (2000a: 155), a series of rel-
evant studies offers “compelling support” for this model. 
Within the skills-based model of leadership, career experiences are 
crucial because “the experience leaders acquire in the course of their 
careers should influence whether requisite knowledge and skills are 
available for problem solving” (Mumford et al., 2000b: 24). Career ex-
periences also have an indirect effect on knowledge and skills in that 
a leader’s career experiences shape his or her individual attributes, 
which are themselves important antecedents to knowledge and skills. 
In turn, a leader’s knowledge and skills determine his or her ability to 
solve complex problems and perform as a leader. 
Applying these notions to the tournament among top managers 
for the CEO position, we note that as one rises in the organization, 
solving complex problems becomes more and more important; this 
importance reaches its zenith within the executive suite. To win the 
promotion tournament, which becomes increasingly attractive as the 
pay gap widens, a potential CEO needs to convince others that he or 
she can proficiently solve complex problems and that he or she will 
perform well as the leader of a company. We posit that top manag-
ers who engage in a broad and changing mix of competitive action 
types (and hence, more complex repertoires) gain a more diverse set 
of relevant career experiences than those who implement simple rep-
ertoires, thus putting themselves in a position to win the promotion 
tournament. Top managers with complex competitive repertoires to 
their credit exhibit wider versatility and thereby demonstrate they 
are more promotion-worthy than their less versatile counterparts, 
all else being equal. Top managers vying for an enviable CEO posi-
tion (i.e., one that involves a big jump in pay) want to demonstrate 
that they are broadly knowledgeable and skilled leaders who are pro-
ficient at overseeing a wide range of competitive moves. As a result, 
wide pay gaps not only result in high levels of competitive activity, but 
also highly complex competitive repertoires (controlling for volume). 
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Thus, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 4: The CEO-TMT pay gap is positively associated 
with competitive complexity. 
Tournament-agency interaction 
Agency theory and tournament theory both offer principals the prac-
tical directive that their interests and those of their agents need to 
be aligned (Dalton et al., 2007). Our agency-based hypotheses de-
scribed the direct influence of different types of principals who pres-
sure agents to obtain the kind of behavior they desire (Hoskisson et 
al., 2002). Meanwhile, our tournament theory hypothesis described 
how executive compensation might shape top managers’ behavior, but 
this does not involve external pressure from principals. Scholars sug-
gest that executive compensation tournaments can amplify or substi-
tute for pressure from principals (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; 
Rosen, 1986), so consideration of their potential interaction offers an 
opportunity to advance understanding of agents’ behavior. 
Conceptually, there are several possible scenarios that could mani-
fest themselves when executive compensation tournaments and pres-
sure from institutional investors occur simultaneously. These two gov-
ernance mechanisms could operate independently. This might occur 
if managers are motivated in different ways by external pressure and 
internal compensation structures so that the two forces are additive 
(i.e., no interaction). Another possibility is that one governance mech-
anism substitutes for the other. Compensation tournaments might 
dominate managerial motivations so much that they make shareholder 
pressure unimportant, or perhaps shareholder pressure is such an 
overarching concern that it renders compensation tournaments inef-
fective. In either case, there would be a negative interaction between 
our agency and tournament theory antecedents. 
In contrast to these perspectives, we suggest that the presence 
and influence of dedicated institutional investors will positively in-
teract with the effect of large CEO-TMT pay gaps on executives’ pro-
pensity to develop complex competitive repertoires. High pay gaps al-
ready motivate managers to do so (Gnyawali et al., 2008), thus making 
the presence of dedicated investors welcome. If managers are already 
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motivated to engage in complex competitive repertoires to advance 
their own interests, having acceptance from this key set of princi-
pals reinforces and confirms the preferred behavior. Instead of hav-
ing a principal-agent problem (Dalton et al., 2007), dedicated insti-
tutional investors serve as confederates for managerial agents who 
desire to engage in more complex repertoires with a view toward pro-
motion. The combination of high levels of dedicated ownership and 
high pay gaps pulls managers toward complex repertoires more than 
they would be in the presence of only one of these governance mecha-
nisms. This suggests a positive interaction between CEO-TMT pay gap 
and the firm’s level of dedicated ownership. Stated formally, 
Hypothesis 5: CEO-TMT pay gap (at the end of year t – 1) 
complements the influence of dedicated institutional owner-
ship (at the end of year t – 1) on the complexity of a firm’s 
competitive action repertoire over a given year (year t). Spe-
cifically, there is a positive interactive effect between CEO-
TMT pay gap and dedicated institutional ownership on com-
petitive complexity. 
We do not develop a hypothesis about the interaction between 
CEO-TMT pay gap and level of transient institutional ownership. Un-
like the case of dedicated owners, there is no theoretical reason to pro-
pose an amplified effect in one direction or the other, especially since 
we hypothesize opposite effects for these predictors. We examine and 
discuss this further in a supplementary post-hoc analysis. 
Methodology 
Sample 
Our sample included all publicly traded firms listed in the Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) 1,500 composite index from 2001 to 2010, plus actively 
traded firms that were once a part of the S&P 1,500 but have since 
been removed. Ending in 2010 allowed us to calculate the performance 
trend over several years following the final year of analysis. The S&P 
1,500 index includes firms in the S&P 500 large-cap, S&P 400 mid-
cap, and S&P 600 small cap. The Institutional Shareholder Services 
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(ISS) database adds a few other large publically traded firms, which 
we included as well. ISS is the owner and maintainer of the database 
of directors formerly held by the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC). This database is housed by the University of Pennsyl-
vania’s Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). After eliminating 
firms without complete data, we had a sample of 1,168 firms in 204 
industries (i.e., four-digit NAICS industries). 
We drew data from five main archival sources. We collected firm 
action data from the RavenPack News Analytics database, which ag-
gregates press releases and news articles. The Thomson Reuter data-
base and ExecuComp provided data on ownership structure and com-
pensation, respectively. We collected board data from ISS and firm and 
industry level characteristics from Compustat. 
Measures 
Competitive repertoire complexity 
Following previous competitive dynamics literature, we defined com-
petitive actions as externally directed, specific, and observable moves 
initiated by a firm to enhance its competitive position (Ferrier et al., 
1999; Smith et al., 1991). RavenPack scans for action-level data in the 
Dow Jones Financial Wires, Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and Market-
Watch, plus all the daily press releases and regulatory disclosures from 
22 different newswires (Twedt, 2016). The database records an entry 
any time one of these sources reports on a company. 
RavenPack covers over 36,000 companies, including all of the com-
panies in our sample. The database identifies the first mention of 
any given competitive action in order to eliminate duplication (Drake, 
Guest, and Twedt, 2014). RavenPack uses a patented algorithm to clas-
sify articles into categories (Lin, Massa, and Zhang, 2014). Rather than 
manually extracting news items, the program uses textual analysis, 
parts-of-speech tagging, adjacent word relationships, and language 
tokens (i.e., markers, such as dates) to identify and classify news ar-
ticles. Though researchers have been manually coding business news 
events for decades (e.g., Chen, 2009; Chen, Smith, and Grimm, 1992), 
the steadily increasing volume of news sources and analyses calls for 
more automated approaches. To deal with the tens of thousands of 
business news stories published each day, RavenPack uses taxonomic 
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recognition algorithms to (1) identify entities mentioned in a story, 
(2) extract the story theme, (3) determine the role the entity played 
in the story, and (4) categorize the story as an event. For each story, 
RavenPack identifies a topic (which is a theme of events), group (col-
lection of related events), type (class of events that share similar char-
acteristics), and properties (such as the named entity and role), which 
allow for precise categorization of each story (cf. http://www.raven-
pack.com/products/ravenpack-news-analytics/ ). 
For our study, we examined eight major types of competitive ac-
tions that align with prior research on competitive dynamics (Derfus 
et al., 2008; Ferrier, 2001; Upson et al., 2012). These are as follows: 
new product actions, capacity-related actions, pricing actions, mar-
keting actions, acquisitions, strategic alliances, market expansion, and 
legal actions. Table 1 shows examples of each type. Our data collec-
tion uncovered 87,941 total competitive actions. This is an average of 
10.76 actions per firm per year (firms may be in the data for less than 
10 years, for example if they are acquired), which is consistent with 
prior research (Derfus et al., 2008; Rindova et al., 2010). 
Based on the RavenPack identification of competitive actions, we 
created a composite measure of competitive repertoire complexity 
annually for each firm in our sample. Competitive dynamics schol-
ars nearly always measure competitive complexity using some form 
of weighted diversity index, such as a Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) (Basdeo et al., 2006; Ferrier, 2001; Yu et al., 2009) or Blau’s in-
dex (Andrevski, Brass, and Ferrier, 2013; Chi et al., 2010; Gnyawali et 
al., 2006). Such an approach simultaneously reflects both how many 
different types of actions there are in a repertoire and how (un)evenly 
firms use different actions. Consistent with this approach, the first 
component of our composite measure is a diversity index. 
To measure this component, we use the Shannon index. This index 
is a natural fit for the competitive dynamics literature. Claude Shan-
non (1948), who is widely known for having founded the field of in-
formation theory, developed an entropy index in the context of cryp-
tography, wherein cryptographers faced a string of letters and were 
trying to determine what could be future letters in the string. Shan-
non’s index is a mathematical representation of the string that shows 
the more different letters there are in the string, and equal their pro-
portions, the more difficult it is to predict future letters. Similarly, a 
focal firm’s competitors face a set of actions that the firm selects from 
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Table 1. Action categories and example headlines
Action category  RavenPack classification  Company  Example headline
New product actions a  Product Release  Barnes & Noble Inc.  Barnes & Nobel Studio Debuts New
   Series: Mr. Literary
 Product Release  Novellus Systems Inc.  Novellus Systems Launches SOLA® xT
   UVTP System for Sub-45nm High
   Volume Manufacturing
Capacity related actions  Facility Close  FootLocker Inc.  Foot Locker Expects to Shutter 117
   Stores
 Facility Upgrade  Cintas Corp.  Cintas Expands Document
   Management Operations in China
Pricing actions  Product Price Cut  Atmel Corp.  Atmel Reduces System Cost in
   Industrial Applications with
   High-Quality Video Decoding
   ARM926-based Microprocessor
 Product Price Raise  Carnival Corp/PLC  Carnival to Raise Cruise Prices
Marketing actions  Campaign Ad  Office Depot Inc.  Office Depot and National Association
   of Professional Organizers (NAPO)
   Launch Campaign to Help Business
   Professionals Get Organized in the
   New Year
 Campaign Ad  United Parcel Service Inc.  UPS Racing Unveils Commercials and
   Online Sweepstakes to Launch 2010
   NASCAR Season
Acquisitions  Acquisition - Acquirer  Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc.  Bio-Rad Complete the Purchase of
   Certain Diagnostics Businesses of
   Biotest AG
 Acquisition - Acquirer  SPX Corp.  SPX Complete Acquisition of
   Gerstenberg Schroder
Strategic alliances  Joint Venture  Scientific Games Corp.  Playtech Signs Joint Venture with
   Scientific Games
 Partnership  McAfee Inc.  Brocade and McAfee Enter Strategic
   Partnership to Deliver
   Comprehensive Network Security
   Solutions
Market expansion  Market Entry  Texas Instruments Inc.  Texas Instruments to Enter E-Reader  
   Market
 Market Entry  Synaptics Inc.  Synaptics Enters Home Appliance
   Market
Legal actions  Legal Issue - Plaintiff  Microsoft Corp.  Microsoft Sues TiVo, Claiming Patent
   Infringement
 Legal Issue - Plaintiff  DirecTV Group Inc.  DirecTV Sues Dish Network Over
   ’Why Pay More’ Commercials
a. “New product actions” describe product releases within a market in which the firm already competes. “Market expansion” describes 
new product or geographic markets where the firm does not yet compete.
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a number of categories. These constitute a competitive repertoire, 
much like a string of text. Competitors would be interested in know-
ing what likely future actions a firm will take, as a cryptanalyst wants 
to know what are likely to be future letters in a string (strings are not 
letters embedded in words because they are encoded). 
The Shannon index “is comparable to the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index (HHI)” (Straathof, 2007: 298), but it offers a slightly more ap-
ropos measure of diversity for the context of competition between 
firms because it encompasses the notion of quantifying the ability to 
predict future letters/moves. By this we mean the difficulty a com-
petitor would have predicting what future competitive actions might 
be, based solely on examining prior actions (Jost, 2006). Statistically, 
the two indices yield similar results, but the Herfindahl index fails 
to capture variance among the most concentrated and the most di-
verse types of profiles. As an illustration of the indices’ differences, 
consider their values for the case of five actions in five different cat-
egories and ten actions in ten categories. Using the Herfindahl index, 
both of these repertoires return a score of one. However, the Shannon 
index for five actions in five categories is 1.61 and for ten actions in 
ten categories it is 2.30. Thus, the Shannon index recognizes the lat-
ter choice as being a more sophisticated repertoire of competitive ac-
tions, whereas the HHI does not. 
The Shannon index is calculated as follows: 
                  R 
S = − ∑ pi ln pi 
                 
i=1
where pi is the proportion of competitive actions belonging to the ith 
competitive action category of R total categories. This index ranges 
from a high of ln(R) when all types of competitive actions are equally 
common and approaches zero as actions become more concentrated. 
The second component of our composite measure of competitive 
complexity incorporates the notion of change, which we captured with 
a measure of the difference between the firms’ competitive action rep-
ertoire in the prior year and the focal year of analysis. We operation-
alized this as the Euclidean Distance, D(t-1)t, between the two action 
repertoires, as follows: 
D(t−1)t = SQRT [( A1(t−1) − A1t )2 + ( A2(t−1) − A2t )2 … ( A8(t−1) − A8t )2] 
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where A1 through A8 are the number of actions taken in action cat-
egories 1 through 8 by the focal firm in the indicated year. We chose 
the Euclidean Distance measure because we are interested in how a 
firm changes its competitive action repertoire from one year to the 
next. Others, such as Ferrier (2001), and Ferrier and Lee (2002), have 
used INDEL costs, which are calculated from the Levenshtein Distance 
between competitive repertoires, to calculate what they call strategic 
unpredictability. The two measures are similar, but the Levenshtein 
Distance assigns penalties for every insertion, deletion, or substitu-
tion associated with conversion from one repertoire to the next be-
cause it is concerned with the order of events. Our data, however, are 
annualized, so we do not wish to distinguish, for example, between a 
pricing action followed (however long within the year) by an acquisi-
tion versus an acquisition followed by a pricing action. Thus, Euclid-
ean Distance, rather than INDEL costs, is the appropriate measure for 
annual competitive repertoire comparisons. 
Euclidean Distance describes action repertoire change, or how 
much the firm’s competitive repertoire has repeated itself from time 
t – 1 to time t (Upson et al., 2012), but it does not capture the degree 
to which firms are engaging in new action types. A firm could, for 
instance, increase or decrease the number of competitive actions of 
types in which they were already engaged. For example, in 2007 one 
prominent retailer, the Gap, changed its competitive repertoire con-
siderably from what it did in 2006, but it did so without introducing 
any new types of competitive actions. To account for this, we counted 
the number of types of actions in which a firm engaged at time t but 
in which it did not engage at time t – 1. Although they both address 
aspects of change from the prior year to the focal year, the Euclidean 
Distance and the new action type count measure different things and 
are not strongly correlated (r=0.12). 
We created z-scores from the three assessments—the Shannon in-
dex, Euclidean Distance, and new action count—and summed these 
scores to create a composite measure of competitive complexity. Our 
use of this composite score helped ensure that our measure captured 
the dimensions of competitive complexity noted in our conceptual de-
velopment—diversity, change, and newness. 
To illustrate why including change and newness improves our abil-
ity to capture competitive repertoire complexity, consider again two 
prominent retailers in 2007. Using a diversity index alone, Kohl’s had 
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a higher score than did Finish Line. Unlike that index, however, our 
composite measure accounts for the fact that Kohl’s scored low on 
change and added only one new action type in 2007, while Finish Line 
had a high change score and added five new action types in 2007. As a 
result, Finish Line scored higher on our competitive complexity mea-
sure than did Kohl’s. 
Performance 
We operationalized short-term performance as return on assets (ROA) 
expressed as a percentage at the end of the focal year under investiga-
tion (Ndofor et al., 2011). We operationalized firms’ performance trend 
over time as the slope of the regression of ROA over three years, begin-
ning with the focal year of analysis (Connelly et al., 2016). Individual 
firm growth trends allowed us to observe the trajectory of firm per-
formance, providing more detail about firm-level changes than sim-
ple averages or snapshots of performance. We selected a three-year 
period because it provides enough information (i.e., four data points, 
t, t+1, t+2, and t+3) to calculate a relatively long-term trend without 
getting too temporally removed from the competitive action reper-
toires under investigation. 
Independent variables 
The dedicated and transient ownership variables focus on the level 
of institutional ownership, accounting for shareholders with at least 
one percent equity in a focal firm during our sampling window. This 
restriction removes owners with marginal equity positions. We cate-
gorized each institutional owner in accordance with Bushee’s (1998) 
classification system as being either dedicated, transient, or neither, 
for each year of the analysis. Dedicated and transient ownership are 
thus the percentage of a firm’s total shares held by dedicated or tran-
sient institutional investors, respectively. On average, dedicated own-
ers held 4.13 percent of firm shares and transient investors held 11.50 
percent. 
To arrive at these figures, we categorized each institutional inves-
tor according to their past trading behavior as described by portfo-
lio diversification, portfolio turnover, and trading sensitivity. Portfo-
lio diversification is a composite measure of the average percentage 
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of the institution’s holdings invested in each firm, the average size of 
the institution’s ownership position in its portfolio, the percentage of 
holdings that are greater than five percent, and a concentration in-
dex of the institution’s holdings. Portfolio turnover is a combination 
of the annual change in ownership in the previous two years and the 
percentage of firms that the institution has held continuously over the 
previous two years. Trading sensitivity combines a ratio of changes 
in ownership position to firms’ earning announcements with the av-
erage earnings change in firms bought minus firms sold. Dedicated 
institutional investors have low portfolio diversification, low portfo-
lio turnover, and low trading sensitivity; in contrast, transient insti-
tutional investors have high portfolio diversification, high turnover, 
and high trading sensitivity. 
CEO-TMT pay gap measures tournament incentives among top 
managers. We measured pay gap as the difference between the CEO’s 
total compensation and the average total compensation of the TMT’s 
four highest-paid members other than the CEO (Henderson and Fred-
rickson, 2001; Shi, Connelly, and Sanders, in press). Because CEO-
TMT pay gap is not normally distributed, we monotonically trans-
formed it by taking the natural logarithm of the difference, plus a 
constant that made all observations positive (Shi, Connelly, and Sand-
ers, 2016).We centered all independent variables before adding them 
into our models. 
Control variables 
Prior research has suggested that large and high-performing firms can 
have complex competitive repertoires (Ndofor et al., 2011), so we con-
trolled for firm size as the natural logarithm of sales and prior perfor-
mance as ROA at time t – 1. Firms whose resources are liquid may be 
able to engage in complex repertoires, so we control for the current 
ratio as (current assets)/(current liabilities). Old firms may be more 
resistant to change, so we control for firm age. CEOs that also chair 
the board of directors could be less creative in their competitive en-
deavors (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996) so we control for CEO dual-
ity with a dummy variable. Because near-term options that executives 
can exercise could motivate their self-interest in specific competitive 
moves, we control for the TMT’s in-the-money, exercisable options. We 
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are interested in competitive complexity as opposed to the volume of 
competitive activity, so we control for volume of competitive activity 
as the number of actions taken. 
We also control for potential influence of the board of directors, 
given our emphasis on corporate governance constraints. Board size is 
a count of the number of directors. Board tenure is the average num-
ber of years a firm’s directors have served on the board (Hillman et 
al., 2011). Board age is the average age of all a firm’s directors. 
In addition, we control for industry characteristics that might in-
fluence competitive repertoires. Industry munificence refers to the re-
sources available to all firms in an industry, which we measure as the 
regression of sales over time divided by mean industry sales (Boyd, 
1995). Industry dynamism refers to the level of instability in an en-
vironment; we calculated this as the standard error of munificence 
(Boyd, 1995). Industry concentration captures whether a small num-
ber of firms dominate an industry; we measured this using a stan-
dard Herfindahl index of industry sales (Boyd, 1995). Because we have 
panel data, we include year dummies to account for contemporane-
ous correlation (Certo and Semadeni, 2006). 
Analytical technique 
Our dataset is a hierarchical panel with firms nested within indus-
tries. We managed the annual panel settings using Stata’s xtset func-
tion. Because competitive norms vary by industry (Ferrier, 2001), we 
needed to account for potential unobserved heterogeneity across mul-
tiple industries. We defined industry groups as all firms within a four-
digit NAICS classification because our large sample size afforded the 
opportunity for a fine level of differentiation between groups. We 
used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to analyze the data because 
it allows for investigation of relationships across levels by recogniz-
ing the partial interdependency of observations and explicitly model-
ing both firm- and industry-level residuals. Panelized HLM controls 
for potential autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity by accounting for 
the panel structure of the data and both within- and between-indus-
try variance (Hofmann, 1997). 
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Results 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for all study 
variables. All variance inflation scores are well below a conservative 
threshold of five, so multicollinearity does not appear to be a concern. 
Hypothesis tests 
We first examined the effects of competitive complexity on short-term 
performance, as described in Hypotheses 1a. We measured both com-
petitive complexity and ROA at the end of the focal year (time t) be-
cause competitive complexity constitutes a set of actions that occur 
throughout the year, but ROA is measured on the last day of the year. 
Conceptually, we intended to capture the actions’ immediate impact, 
and the traditional lag structure could result in an appreciable gap be-
tween when the actions occurred and when we measure ROA. Consis-
tent with this approach, we also measured the volume of competitive 
activity at time t because this control variable also represents com-
petitive actions taken throughout the year. We measure all other con-
trol variables with a one-year lag, at time t – 1. 
Table 3 reports the results for the influence of competitive complex-
ity on short-term performance. Model 1 reveals that the control vari-
ables of firm size, prior performance, in-the-money options, volume 
of competitive activity, and board size and tenure are all predictors of 
short-term performance. In Model 2, the coefficient for competitive 
complexity is negative and strongly predictive of short-term perfor-
mance (β =−0.280, p<0.001), providing support for Hypothesis 1a. 
We also tested our hypothesis about the firms’ performance trends. 
Here again, we used competitive complexity and volume of competi-
tive actions at the focal year of analysis (time t) and all other variables 
at the end of the prior year (time t – 1). Model 3 in Table 4 shows that 
several controls (firm size, prior performance, current ratio, in-the-
money options, board size, transient ownership, and pay gap) are key 
predictors.6 Model 4 shows that competitive complexity is positively 
6. Three of our controls showed different effects for short-term performance and 
performance trend. Large firms, firms with good past performance, and firms with 
smaller boards are more likely to perform better in the short term (Table 3). The first 
two of these appear straightforward as large firms often enjoy economies of scale, 
and past performance is an indicator of future performance. The link between small 
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(β =0.183, p=0.032) associated with the performance trend. Model 5 
then tests the hypothesized curvilinear relationship, suggesting that 
the squared term of competitive complexity is negatively associated 
with the firms’ performance trend (β =−0.017, p=0.064). The results 
in Models 4 and 5 yield a pattern that is seemingly consistent with an 
inverted-U shaped relationship, as predicted in Hypothesis 1b.   
Table 5 reports the results for our agency theory predictions about 
antecedents of competitive complexity. As shown in Model 6, firm 
size, prior performance, in-the-money options, volume of competi-
tive activity, industry concentration, and all our board variables are 
strong predictors of performance trend. In Model 7, as predicted in 
Hypothesis 2, firms’ level of dedicated institutional ownership is pos-
itively associated with competitive complexity (β =0.670, p=0.033). 
The level of transient institutional ownership, however, is not asso-
ciated with competitive complexity (β =0.132, p=0.625), so Hypoth-
esis 3 is not supported. 
We test our hypothesis about tournament theory in Model 7 to-
gether with the other direct effects. As predicted in Hypothesis 4, this 
model shows that the direct effect of a firm’s pay gap between the 
CEO and TMT is positively associated with competitive complexity (β 
=0.384, p=0.016). The final hypothesis examines the interaction be-
tween our agency theory prediction about dedicated institutional own-
ership and our tournament theory predication about CEO-TMT pay 
gap. In Model 8, this interaction is positive (β =10.559, p=0.002), as 
predicted in Hypothesis 5.  
boards and better short-term performance may be reflective of small boards being 
able to make fast decisions, allowing them to be nimble and responsive to the envi-
ronment. For the performance trend (Table 4), small firms often grow quickly, so al-
though the level of their short-term performance (i.e., ROA) may not match that of 
their large competitors, they are likely to see growth over time (i.e., large year-over-
year percentage increases are common for small firms). The negative relationship 
between past performance and performance trend could be due to firms that expe-
rience appreciable short-term declines, but then climb back to where they were be-
fore the decline. Last, large boards appear to improve performance over time. One 
possibility is that large boards may make slow decisions, but they also make good 
decisions. They may be less nimble than their small-board counterparts, but they are 
also less likely to make big mistakes. We appreciate an anonymous reviewer encour-
aging us to note these differences and discuss possible reasons for their occurrence. 
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Table 3. Results of hierarchical linear modeling
Variables  Model 1   Model 2
Constant  −0.619  0.782  −1.038  0.643
 (2.240)   (2.239)
Firm size  0.455  0.000  0.554  0.000
 (0.122)   (0.124)
Prior performance  0.402  0.000  0.400  0.000
 (0.009)   (0.009)
Current ratio  −0.088  0.122  −0.084  0.139
 (0.057)   (0.057)
Firm age  −0.001  0.896  −0.001  0.919
 (0.009)   (0.009)
CEO duality  0.291  0.227  0.312  0.195
 (0.241)   (0.241)
TMT in-the-money, exercisable options  −9.844  0.000  −9.576  0.000
 (1.929)   (1.928)
Volume of competitive activity  0.011  0.049  0.022  0.000
 (0.005)   (0.006)
Board size  −0.162  0.011  −0.149  0.018
 (0.063)   (0.063)
Board tenure  0.122  0.001  0.114  0.001
 (0.035)   (0.035)
Board age  0.039  0.257  0.034  0.319
 (0.034)   (0.034)
Industry munificence  −0.691  0.703  −0.597  0.742
 (1.813)   (1.810)
Industry dynamism  2.888  0.671  2.615  0.700
 (6.796)   (6.787)
Industry concentration  1.531  0.165  1.397  0.205
 (1.103)   (1.102)
Dedicated ownership  −0.451  0.805  −0.268  0.884
 (1.831)   (1.829)
Transient ownership  2.374  0.132  2.402  0.127
 (1.576)   (1.574)
Pay gap  0.708  0.453  0.829  0.379
 (0.943)   (0.943)
Competitive complexity    −0.280  0.000
   (0.065)
Year dummy variables  Included   Included
N  8,173   8,173
Chi-sq  2365.2  0.000  2389.7  0.000
df  25   26
Standard errors in parentheses, P-values in italics.
DV: Short-term performance.
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Table 4. Results of hierarchical linear modeling
Variables  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
Constant  −2.119  0.470  −1.834  0.532  −1.605  0.585
 (2.935)   (2.937)   (2.939)
Firm size  −0.620  0.000  −0.686  0.000  −0.735  0.000
 (0.160)   (0.162)   (0.165)
Prior performance  −0.097  0.000  −0.097  0.000  −0.096  0.000
 (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.012)
Current ratio  0.367  0.000  0.364  0.000  0.360  0.000
 (0.074)   (0.074)   (0.074)
Firm age  0.011  0.363  0.011  0.369  0.012  0.345
 (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.012)
CEO duality  0.042  0.894  0.026  0.933  0.037  0.906
 (0.315)   (0.315)   (0.315)
TMT in-the-money, exercisable options  −12.552  0.000  −12.725  0.000  −12.790  0.000
 (2.461)   (2.462)   (2.461)
Volume of competitive activity  −0.005  0.473  −0.012  0.114  −0.007  0.406
 (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.008)
Board size  0.179  0.030  0.171  0.038  0.167  0.042
 (0.082)   (0.082)   (0.082)
Board tenure  −0.054  0.238  −0.048  0.288  −0.047  0.302
 (0.046)   (0.046)   (0.046)
Board age  −0.002  0.965  0.001  0.978  0.003  0.950
 (0.045)   (0.045)   (0.045)
Industry munificence  0.960  0.685  0.879  0.711  0.826  0.727
 (2.371)   (2.370)   (2.370)
Industry dynamism  −0.742  0.933  −0.533  0.952  −0.469  0.958
 (8.885)   (8.882)   (8.881)
Industry concentration  −2.242  0.119  −2.162  0.133  −2.104  0.144
 (1.440)   (1.439)   (1.440)
Dedicated ownership  3.303  0.165  3.197  0.179  3.305  0.164
 (2.376)   (2.376)   (2.376)
Transient ownership  4.244  0.039  4.235  0.040  4.300  0.037
 (2.060)   (2.060)   (2.060)
Pay gap  2.375  0.049  2.298  0.057  2.293  0.057
 (1.205)   (1.206)   (1.205)
Competitive complexity    0.183  0.032  0.263  0.006
   (0.085)   (0.096)
Competitive complexity2      −0.017  0.064
     (0.009)
Year dummy variables  Included   Included   Included
N  7,702   7,702   7,702
Chi-sq  574.2  0.000  579.1  0.000  582.8  0.000
df  25   26   27
Standard errors in parentheses, P-values in italics.
DV: Performance trend.
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Table 5. Results of hierarchical linear modeling
Variables  Model 6   Model 7   Model 8
Constant  −1.771  0.000  −1.769  0.000  −1.725  0.000
 (0.381)   (0.392)   (0.392)
Firm size  0.372  0.000  0.365  0.000  0.361  0.000
 (0.021)   (0.022)   (0.022)
Prior performance  −0.005  0.002  −0.005  0.003  −0.005  0.003
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)
Current ratio  0.013  0.174  0.013  0.175  0.012  0.206
 (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.010)
Firm age  0.001  0.528  0.001  0.548  0.001  0.499
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)
CEO duality  0.071  0.083  0.066  0.112  0.063  0.125
 (0.041)   (0.041)   (0.041)
TMT in-the-money, exercisable options  0.861  0.009  0.859  0.009  0.825  0.012
 (0.328)   (0.328)   (0.328)
Volume of competitive activity  0.038  0.000  0.039  0.000  0.039  0.000
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)
Board size  0.042  0.000  0.042  0.000  0.042  0.000
 (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.011)
Board tenure  −0.027  0.000  −0.026  0.000  −0.025  0.000
 (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)
Board age  −0.015  0.011  −0.015  0.014  −0.015  0.013
 (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)
Industry munificence  0.215  0.508  0.232  0.474  0.220  0.497
 (0.325)   (0.325)   (0.325)
Industry dynamism  −0.405  0.743  −0.316  0.798  −0.323  0.794
 (1.235)   (1.234)   (1.233)
Industry concentration  −0.464  0.049  −0.462  0.050  −0.460  0.050
 (0.236)   (0.235)   (0.235)
Dedicated ownership    0.670  0.033  0.728  0.020
   (0.314)   (0.314)
Transient ownership    0.132  0.625  0.141  0.600
   (0.269)   (0.269)
Pay gap    0.384  0.016  0.491  0.003
   (0.159)   (0.163)
Ded. ownership × Pay gap      10.559  0.002
     (3.490)
Year dummy variables  Included   Included   Included
N  8,173   8,173   8,173
Chi-sq  4287.8  0.000  4305.2  0.000  4320.1  0.000
df  22   25   26
Standard errors in parentheses, P-values in italics.
DV: Competitive complexity.
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Supplementary analyses 
As mentioned, we did not develop a formal hypothesis about the in-
teractive effect between firms’ CEO-TMT pay gap and their level of 
transient institutional investment because we expected these forces 
to cancel each other out. This interaction (not reported) is not a good 
predictor of competitive complexity. 
We derived our control variables for board influence on strategic 
outcomes from Golden and Zajac (2001), but these authors actually 
suggest that our board control variables (board size, average tenure, 
and average age) have curvilinear relationships with firm outcomes. 
To test whether this possibility would affect our findings, we added 
squared terms for these control variables to our models and found that 
two of them (size and tenure) did, in fact, have curvilinear effects, but 
the results of our models with these additional squared controls were 
substantively the same. 
Given the large number of control variables in our models, we also 
checked for the possibility of over-fitting by looking at the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1987). The AIC resolves the poten-
tial problem of model over-fitting by introducing a penalty for the num-
ber of parameters in the model. Models with low values of AIC offer the 
best balance between model fit and specificity. The AIC for Model 6 with 
control variables is 32,278, and for Model 8 with all predictors the AIC 
is 32,266. This suggests that the full model, which accounts for all hy-
pothesized variables and control variables together, provide a better fit 
to the data than the model with our control variables only. 
Last, we tested for endogeneity in our performance models. Consid-
ering that capability is a key antecedent to competitive actions (Chen, 
1996), it is possible that firms with high performance in the short term, 
or increasing performance trends leading up to the focal year of analy-
sis, are better able to engage in complex competitive repertoires. Thus, 
there is some potential for reverse causality. To address this issue, we 
conducted instrument variable regressions using xtivreg2 in Stata to 
help determine if competitive repertoire complexity is exogenous. 
We identified competitive action richness and the firm’s net plant, 
property, and equipment (PPE) as exogenous and relevant instrumen-
tal variables (Kennedy, 2008). Richness of a firm’s competitive rep-
ertoire is a count of the number of different action types a firm un-
dertakes in a given year, but does not account for the total number of 
actions, the concentration of those actions, or repetitiveness of actions 
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between years. As a result, richness should be related to competitive 
repertoire complexity, without necessarily having a strong relation 
to short-term performance (r=-0.02) or the firms’ performance over 
time (r=-0.01). Similarly, a firm’s net PPE represents the cost of all 
buildings included in its PPE account, minus accumulated deprecia-
tion. A larger net PPE can reflect more valuable assets and represent a 
firm’s ability to engage in competitive actions (Chen, 1996), but hold-
ing these resources alone should not necessarily influence short-term 
performance (r=0.02) or the performance trend (r=−0.01). 
Using these two instrumental variables (richness and net PPE), 
we examined the strength of our instruments for complexity using 
xtivreg2 in both the short-term performance and performance trend 
models. In both cases, a high Chi-2 statistic for the under-identifica-
tion test (p<0.001), and a much lower Chi-2 for the over-identifica-
tion test (p=0.149 and p=0.830) suggest that our instruments pre-
dict competitive repertoire complexity, but are not correlated with 
the DV beyond their indirect relationship to the DV via complexity. 
Further, in testing for weak instruments, or instruments that have a 
weak relationship with competitive complexity, we find F-statistics 
far greater than the recommended threshold of 10. Collectively, these 
findings suggest that richness and net PPE are relevant and strong in-
struments in both of our models. Using these two instrumental vari-
ables, we conducted endogeneity tests in both the short-term perfor-
mance and performance trend models. The endog() option in xtivreg2 
presents an endogeneity test that examines if a potentially endoge-
nous regressor can be treated as exogenous, allowing for a more ef-
ficient estimator to be used than the instrument variables approach. 
In both the short-term performance and performance trend models, 
we failed to reject the null hypothesis that competitive complexity can 
be treated as exogenous, indicating that endogeneity is unlikely to be 
problematic to our models. 
Discussion 
Antecedents to competitive repertoire complexity 
Relying on agency theory, we theorized and found that the pres-
ence of dedicated institutional investors encourages firms to engage 
in complex competitive repertoires. Using tournament theory, we 
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hypothesized and found that the CEO-TMT pay gap was an important 
predictor of the extent to which a firm engages in complex compet-
itive repertoires. Last, we also found that the dedicated investors of 
our agency theory arguments and the CEO-TMT pay gap of our tour-
nament theory arguments complemented each other with respect to 
their influence on firms’ competitive repertoire complexity. Little past 
work has examined how shareholders and compensation structures 
jointly affect firm outcomes, but our results make progress toward 
integrating governance research with work on competitive dynam-
ics. One implication is that scholars should account for these poten-
tial drivers in future competitive dynamics studies, or such studies 
will risk underspecifying the antecedents of a firm’s choice of com-
petitive moves. 
Contrary to our prediction (i.e., Hypothesis 3), ownership by tran-
sient investors was not associated negatively with competitive com-
plexity. Perhaps there are different kinds of transient institutional in-
vestors that we did not capture with our operationalization, which is 
based on trading behavior. Some transient institutional investors may 
be more knowledgeable than others, and as such, for certain firms the 
former occasionally act more like dedicated investors. Knowledgeable 
transient investors could wash out the influence of other transient in-
vestors that happen to be less knowledgeable, and consequently, less 
aware of the strategic benefits of complex repertoires. Given this po-
tential explanation, viewing transient investors as a monolithic group 
could mask a source of variance. We thus recommend that future 
scholars gather primary data (as opposed to our use of secondary 
data) on owner types because this might help tease out important dif-
ferences that are not obvious from using empirical categorizations. 
Future competitive dynamics research might also expand to ex-
plore other forms of ownership. Many large public firms, such as 
Walmart and Samsung, have dominant family shareholders in place, 
and these owners often have strong opinions about the activities in 
which the firm should engage. Other types of principals are becom-
ing more prominent, such as sovereign wealth funds, which are en-
tities affiliated with national governments. We can imagine the sov-
ereign wealth fund of Dubai, for example, perhaps pressuring a firm 
that it partially owns to compete in the Middle East (or facilitating its 
ability to compete there). Scholars might also consider the evolving 
ways in which principals interact with one another. For instance, given 
the rise of proxy access proposals (Campbell et al., 2012), different 
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institutional investors could find themselves sitting together on boards 
of directors, which could radically influence the extent to which they 
coordinate and impose joint pressure on executives. 
Another important extension of agency theory might investigate 
board influences on competitive complexity, which was outside the 
scope of our study. All of our board-related controls were meaning-
ful predictors of firms’ mix of competitive actions. For instance, large 
boards are associated with complex repertoires, and somewhat curi-
ously, young, short-tenured directors are associated with low com-
petitive complexity. Thus, there may be some competing influences 
among board characteristics. We expect some boards may be better 
than others at monitoring competitive activity, and some may be bet-
ter able to receive and process information about firms’ competitive 
actions, which could help explain the causal mechanisms behind these 
relationships. Future scholars might examine how boards exhibit com-
plex or simple properties, ex ante to competitive behavior, arising from 
their culture, experience, or information processing, and how these 
characteristics affect the strategic guidance boards offer with respect 
to competitive complexity. There may also be a need to further explore 
how the board’s composition, interactions, processes, and social net-
work structure gives rise to a collective-cognitive framework that, in 
turn, shapes the firm’s competitive action repertoire. 
Our study is also likely to be of interest to those doing work on 
tournament theory. Whereas tournament theory’s emphasis in the 
management literature has been on pay gaps encouraging employees 
to work harder (Devaro, 2006), our study adds that they also work 
more broadly in an effort to distinguish themselves, and hopefully, in-
crease their chances of becoming the next CEO. Specifically, we the-
orize and find that tournaments increase the breadth of activity in 
which people engage as they try to prove themselves worthy of pro-
motion. This is a seemingly novel twist on tournament theory that ex-
pands its reach from being mainly a theory of efficiency (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981) to being useful for predicting different kinds of outcomes, 
such as the variety of competitive actions. 
Scholars might build on our application of tournament theory to 
competitive complexity by exploring the relationship in more depth. 
For example, we can envision important boundary conditions to our 
findings. Tournament theory offers its greatest explanatory power 
when tournament participants (i.e., top managers) compete rela-
tively independent of one another (Shi et al., 2016). When managers 
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coordinate or are dependent on one another for success, it reduces 
competition among them (Main, O’Reilly, and Wade, 1993). As a result, 
tournament theory’s predictions about competitive complexity might 
be more accurate in settings wherein top managers operate autono-
mously. For instance, our tournament theory arguments could hold 
for firms with unrelated diversification, but have less potency when 
firms have highly related business units that require cooperation and 
information sharing. Similarly, tournament theory also incorporates 
a stochastic component that allows for an element of randomness to 
tournament outcomes (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990). In scenarios 
wherein luck, noise, or other random factors make important contri-
butions to managerial output (e.g., in uncertain environments), the 
CEO-TMT pay gap may not be a good predictor of managerial behav-
ior (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
Our study also contributes to research on the concept of competi-
tive complexity (Miller, 1993) in part by introducing the notion of time 
to the construct. Prior work has described complexity mainly as the 
diversity of a firm’s competitive action repertoire (Ferrier et al., 1999; 
Rindova et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2009), but we leverage theory and re-
search to add that it also involves change and the newness of com-
petitive action types. Returning to our prior illustration of Kohl’s and 
Finish Line highlights why including these two elements improves our 
ability to capture competitive repertoire complexity. In 2007, Kohl’s 
appeared to be more competitively complex than Finish Line when 
applying a narrow measure (e.g., a diversity index), but Finish Line 
scored higher in terms of our composite measure. 
The performance effects of competitive repertoire complexity 
In terms of explaining firm performance—a goal that is central to stra-
tegic management research (Nag, Hambrick, and Chen, 2007)—pre-
vious inquiry has hinted at the possibility of differential short- and 
long-term consequences of competitive complexity, but not tested it 
empirically (Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Miller and Chen, 1996a). As we 
predicted, competitive complexity was found to adversely affect short-
term performance but improve firms’ performance over time, control-
ling for competitive aggressiveness (i.e., the number of competitive ac-
tions). Our findings about the implications of competitive complexity 
for short-term performance and the performance trend suggest that 
firms can benefit from aiming for a careful balance between simplicity 
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and complexity that will allow them to gain the advantages of com-
plex competitive repertoires, but without confusing stakeholders or 
overburdening their executive team. 
Future research into the competitive complexity—performance 
relationship might benefit from examining transient investors more 
closely. As shown in Table 4, our results suggest that transient own-
ership has a positive impact on a firm’s long-term performance trend. 
This indicates that the presence of transient institutional investors 
might benefit firms, even though many executives—and strategic man-
agement theorists—view them as detrimental. One potential explana-
tion is that transient institutional investors could prod executives to 
answer a different set of challenging questions about their decisions 
and performance compared to the questions dedicated investors are 
asking, and dealing with a broader set of questions leads companies 
to improve. 
Our results regarding the competitive complexity—performance 
link also offer potentially important practical implications. Some firms 
may be reluctant to pull the trigger on building more complex com-
petitive repertoires, knowing that doing so could hurt their bottom 
line in the short term, but we find that doing so can provide rewards 
if they stick with it. Armed with this knowledge, executives may want 
to woo particular types of shareholders (e.g., dedicated institutional 
investors) who provide managers with an extra measure of freedom 
to take on complex competitive repertoires (Bushee, 2004). For exam-
ple, General Electric has stopped providing quarterly earnings guid-
ance (Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal, 2011) with a view toward deter-
ring investors who are looking to make a “quick buck.” Not providing 
quarterly earnings guidance might be entirely acceptable to the kind 
of shareholders who are concerned with the strategic gains that com-
plex repertoires confer. 
To the extent that future studies confirm our results, the link we 
found between competitive complexity and performance suggests that 
firms could benefit from building consideration of the competitive 
complexity concept into their strategy making process. Any potential 
competitive move needs to be judged on its own merits, but also as-
sessing how a potential move shapes the complexity of a competitive 
repertoire can add an extra and valuable dimension to a firm’s self-
assessment efforts. To ensure that complexity is incorporated into the 
strategy making process, a firm might benefit from designating a se-
nior executive to actively monitor the complexity of its competitive 
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repertoire. This point person would work to ensure that complexity 
lies in the sweet spot between being too low and too high. 
Limitations 
We were not able to capture the magnitude of competitive actions; a 
dimension that relates to the amount of resources necessary to imple-
ment an action, its irreversibility, time horizon, and difficulty of im-
plementation. Connelly et al. (2010), for example, hand coded compet-
itive actions taken by 72 firms based on these four dimensions using 
independent raters to arrive at a magnitude score. Adopting such a 
measure would be unwieldy for our study of 1,168 firms and 87,941 
actions. 
A related caveat to our study is that researchers using RavenPack 
cannot provide the same level of fine-grained scrutiny that they can 
within the typical competitive dynamics study. However, our data al-
lowed us to account for intra-industry behavioral norms while estab-
lishing the validity of the relationships across industry boundaries. 
In this way, our study complements extant studies that provide more 
in-depth examinations of actions within a particular industry. Relat-
edly, because the nature of our data did not lend itself well to struc-
tural equation modeling (SEM), scholars might provide further com-
plementarity to extant work by using SEM to assess the causal web of 
relationships involving governance, competitive repertoire complex-
ity, and firm performance. 
Conclusion 
Using data from 1,168 firms that competed in 204 different indus-
tries over a 10-year period, we devoted our attention to unpacking the 
drivers and consequences of competitive complexity. As top managers 
look to engage rivals, they are likely to consider not only their own 
firm’s abilities and rival actions, but also the controlling forces acting 
on them. After all, top managers generally act in ways in which they 
are incentivized, so we should expect them to undertake competitive 
moves for which they will be rewarded and for which they will receive 
the most support. For these reasons, we theorize and find that a firm’s 
ownership structure and relative executive compensation are conse-
quential to the nature of its portfolio of competitive actions. Building 
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competitive complexity might be painful initially but it eventually pays 
off, as long as managers do not go overboard. We hope our study spurs 
more research on competitive complexity and further investigation at 
the intersection of governance and competitive dynamics. 
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